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COMMENT
COMPETITIVE BIDDING ON PUBLIC WORKS IN
WYOMING: DETERMINATIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY
AND PREFERENCE
Increased construction activity in the public sector in
Wyoming is obvious to the casual observer. Future development of industrial potential and natural resources in Wyoming can only result in further expansion in the field of
public construction. In light of this trend the basis and workability of Wyoming's laws relating to public works construction take on added significance.
Legislatures across the United States have concluded
that the best method for awarding public works contracts is
competitive bidding. Although the primary goal of competitive bidding is to obtain the advantages of free and fair competition for the tax-paying public, competitive bidding also
seeks to provide the public works bidder with a fair and effective forum for the award of public construction contracts.1
It is the proper balance between these two goals which is of
concern to this writer. In order to assure that both goals are
met, contract awarding bodies must have a clear understanding of the legal concept of "lowest responsible bidder" as
used in the Wyoming Statutes.' This Comment will attempt
to provide guidelines for interpretating this concept under
present law. It will also attempt to provide awarding bodies
with guidance on questions relating to variations from bid
specifications. Finally, in the area of bidder responsibility,
it will suggest that a new system composed of contractor
pre-qualification and pre-award hearings can assist Wyoming by improving the competitive bidding process.
Copyright-

1976 by the University of Wyoming

1. A. A. B. Electric, Inc. v. Stevenson Pub. School Dist., 5 Wash. App. 887,
491 P.2d 684, 686 (1971).

2. WYO. STAT. § 15.1-344 (1957) and § 15.1-394 (Supp. 1975) (local improvements); WYO. STAT. §§ 15.1-13, -256 (Supp. 1975) (public improvements);
and Wyo. STAT. § 18-292 (Supp. 1975) (construction of county jails). The
implication is that all contracts let for construction or expansion of state
buildings must be let to the "lowest responsible bidder," although the applicable statutes in some cases only require that the "contract be based on
competitive bidding." See Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-647.2, 9-656.2, 21-431.2, 21-431.6,
21-431.8 (Supp. 1975).
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Since the concept of "lowest responsible bidder" includes
not only notions of responsibility, but also determinations of
cost, consideration must be given to the Wyoming statute
which grants a five percent preference to resident contractors
bidding on public works contracts.' Serious questions as to
the constitutionality of such statutes under the Equal Protection and Interstate Commerce clauses of the United States
Constitution must be evaluated in light of recent case law
and public policies applicable to the area of public construction.
DETERMINING THE RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE LOWEST BIDDER

General Bidder Responsibility
The task of determining which bidder on a public works
contract is the "lowest responsible bidder" is usually left to
the discretion and sound judgment of the awarding body,
whether it be a city council, county commission or state
agency.' In general, the charge of the awarding body is to
let the public works contract to the contractor who will provide the best possible facility for the money.' However, in
practice, determination of the responsibility of bidders is not
3. WYO. STAT. § 9-664 (1957), provides as follows:
Whenever a contract is let by the state, or any department
thereof, or any county, city, town, school district, high school district, or other public corporation of the state for the erection, construction, alteration, or repair of any public building, or other
public structure, or for making any addition thereto, or for any
public work or improvements, such contract shall be let, if advertisement for bids is not required, to a resident of the state. If advertisement for bids is required, the contract shall be let to the
responsible resident making the lowest bid if such resident's bid is
not more than five per cent higher than that of the lowest responsible non-resident bidder.
4. See WYO. STAT. § 15.1-13 (Supp. 1975), which provides as follows:
All contracts for purchass of property or for any public improvement, contracts relating to the municipal water supply, contracts for the lightingof streets, public buildings and public places,
and any other public work or improvement excepting contracts for
engineering services required to complete such improvements for
any city or town when the cost exceeds $1,500 shall be advertised
for bid . . . . The contract shall be let to the lowest responsible
bidder . . . . The governing body may reject all bids submitted

when it finds that none of them would serve the public interest.
Although the governing body is required to let the contract to the "lowest
responsible bidder," no guidelines are given to assist in determining the
lowest bidder's responsibility, thus leaving a great degree of discretion
on the issue to said governing body.
5. Clayton v. Salt Lake City, 15 Utah 2d 57, 387 P.2d 93, 94 (1963).
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an easy task, especially when each awarding body must select
its own criteria for such a decision. In the absence of a
factual showing of dishonesty, fraud, collusion or lack of
good faith, courts will not usually interfere with the exercise of the wide latitude of discretion held by awarding
bodies. 6 It, therefore, becomes incumbent that awarding
bodies have a clear understanding of the meaning of "lowest
responsible bidder," especially if the dual goals of competitive bidding are to be obtained.
The concept of "lowest responsible bidder" has been exhaustively discussed by the courts and text writers.7 It includes the following factors:
1. Amount of the bid.
2. Pecuniary ability of the contractor to perform the
contract.
3. Skill and judgment of the contractor.
4. Experience and reputation of the contractor as shown
by past participation in public works projects.
5. Conformity of the contractor's bid with the bid specifications.'
6. And, in Wyoming, the residence of the contractor for
bidding purposes.'
No uniform system for applying these criteria exists in Wyoming, and therefore, their application to different public
works contract situations inevitably leads to conflicts resulting in litigation either by taxpayers who feel the most
responsible bidder has not been selected or by unsuccessful
6. Id.; COHEN, PUBLIC CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS AND THE LAW (1961).
7. Koich v. Cvar, 111 Mont. 463, 110 P.2d 964, 965 (1941) ; Housing Authority
of Opelousa v. Pittman Constr. Co., 264 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1959).
8. Albert F. Ruehl Co. v. Board of Trustees of Schools for Indus. Educ., 85
N.J. Super. 4, 203 A.2d 410, 41'7 (1964).
9. WYO. STAT. § 9-664 (1957). The term "resident" is defined in Wyo. STAT.
§ 9-663 (Supp. 1975), as follows:
Any person who shall have been a bona fide resident of the
state for one year or more immediately prior to bidding upon the
contract; a partnership or association, each member of which shall
have been a bona fide resident of the state for one year or more
immediately prior to bidding upon the contract; a corporation
which has been organized under the laws of the State of Wyoming
and has been in existence therein for one year or more immediately
prior to bidding upon the contract and which has its principle
[sic] office and place of business within the State of Wyoming.
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bidders who feel their rights to a public works contract have
been abridged.1"
The questions relating to the determination of bidder
responsibility per se have never been considered by the Wyoming Supreme Court, perhaps due to the deference presently
given to the discretion existing in awarding bodies. While
the courts may eventually be forced to address such questions, it would seem appropriate to consider various legislative and judicial alternatives available to remedy potential
conflicts.
Variations From Bid Specifications
A question bearing on, but not directly related to, bidder
responsibility has been addressed by the Wyoming Supreme
Court. In Centric Corporationv. Barbarossa& Sons, Inc.,11
the court, in its specific holding, found that the failure to
submit an affirmative action plan as required by the bid
specifications was only a minor and inconsequential omission
which could and should have been waived by the awarding
body.1" More important, however, was the court's announcement of the test to be applied by awarding bodies in determining the materiality of variations from bid specifications.
The court held that a variation is material if it gives the bidder an advantage not allowed the other bidders such that the
competitive nature of the bidding process is destroyed.1" The
difficulty inherent in the court's test is not in its theory but
in its application by the various awarding bodies.
The application of the "competitive advantage" test to
variations from bid specifications has been considered by
courts in other jurisdictions, and their decisions should be
10. Centric Corp. v. Barbarossa & Sons, Inc., 521 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 1974). The
Centric decision deals with the effect of variations from bid specifications
as bearing on a bidder's responsibility.
11. Id. It is important to recognize that variation from bid specifications is an
oftentimes crucial factor in determining bidder responsibility. The court
in Centric, however, would seem to be implying that a material variation
from a bid specification causes an invalidation of the bid, rather than a
determination of bidder responsibility. The distinction may be significant,
but the result is the same.
12. Id. at 878.
13. Id. at 877-78. The court based this test on an earlier Washington decision.
Eastside Disposal Co. v. City of Mercer Island, 9 Wash. App. 667, 513 P.2d
1047 (1973).
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instructive to those involved in this area of the law. In Eastside Disposal Co. v. City of Mercer Island,4 the court held
that a failure to sign a bid may be a mere formality, waivable
by the awarding body, in certain circumstances." The importance of the Eastside decision is that it was based on a
finding that where a bidding requirement is not expressly
made in the authorizing city ordinance, bid specification, or
bid advertisement, then the bid requirement is implicitly
one of form rather than substance. Taken together, Centric
and Eastside suggest that awarding bodies should first determine whether or not the bidding requirement in question
was expressly mentioned. Since this determination may not
always be controlling further criteria should be considered.
The best criterion which has been advanced is that a
variation from bid specifications is not material, and thus
does not raise a competitive advantage, unless it affects the
price, quality, quantity or manner of contract performance,
or affects those things which go into the actual determination of the amount of the bid. 6 A bid variation affecting
the amount of the bid almost always provides a competitive
advantage to the bidder, thereby giving an awarding body
the most reliable indicator of materiality.
Other criteria to look for in the bid variation situation
include rather nebulous concepts such as the intent of the
bidder," and whether or not the effect of a waiver of the
variation would be to deprive the awarding body of assurance that the contract would be performed in accordance
with the bid specifications.'" These last-mentioned criteria
14. Eastside Disposal Co. v. City of Mercer Island, supra note 13, at 1050-51.
15. Id. at 1051. See A. A. B. Electric, Inc. v. Stevenson Pub. School Dist.,
supra note 1, at 686, wherein the court held that the failure to sign a bid,
when this was expressly required by the bid specifications, would be a
substantive variation since an omitted signature would raise a competitive
advantage. This rationale is based on the finding that a lower bidder
could accept or reject an award in retrospect if his signature was absent.
16. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Marshall, 266 Minn. 259, 123 N.W.2d 387, 390 (1963).
The Foley criterion was approved in Otter Tail Power Co. v. MacKichan,
270 Minn. 262, 133 N.W.2d 511 (1965), which in turn was cited with approval in Centric Corp. v. Barbarossa & Sons, Inc., supra note 10, at 877.
As a result it would seem that the Foley rule can be cited as the Wyoming
rule to be used in interpreting the Centric test.
17. Township of River Vale v. R. J. Longo Constr. Co., 127 N.J. Super. 207,
316 A.2d 737, 744-45 (1974).
18. Id. at 741.
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should not be relied on primarily by the awarding body, but
they may be helpful in deciding close questions.
Both the determination of bidder responsibility and the
consideration of bidding variances potentially raise difficult
problems for the awarding bodies. Although established to
assure that the award of a public works contract goes to the
most qualified contractor, and that the public receives the
best possible facility for the money,"9 the competitive bidding
system as it exists in Wyoming does not guarantee attainment of these goals. No indictment of the public contract
awarding bodies in Wyoming is intended, rather the point
must be made that there are procedures and approaches
available which can improve the competitive bidding system
and thus better assure attainment of a viable public works
system.
PRE-QUALIFICATION OF CONTRACTORS SUBMITTING
BIDS ON PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS

If an awarding body is held to have mistakenly granted
a public works contract, the courts may not direct the body
to award the contract to another bidder."0 In such a situation the awarding body may be forced to reconsider the bids
of all bidding contractors, or rebid the entire project.2 ' The
hazards inherent in such a situation warrant consideration
of any procedures available to reduce the possibility of mistake by the awarding body. Pre-qualification of contractors
desiring to bid on public works projects is one option used
by numerous states to avoid mistakes in determinations of
general bidder responsibility."
19. Clayton v. Salt Lake City, supra note 5.
20. Centric Corp. v. Barbarossa & Sons, Inc., supra note 10, at 878.
21. It would seem fundamentally unfair to reconsider existing bids due to the
fact that the contractor involved in any such litigation would be put in
a potentially disfavored light before an awarding body whose decision has
been overruled. On the other hand, rebidding the project would seem unfair
in that the bidders would then have knowledge of the bids submitted by
the other bidders.
22. A significant number of states have prequalification requirements relating
to public works bidding. The most notable include: Alaska, 27 Op. ATTry
GEN. (1959); California, CAL. GOv'T. CODE § 14310, et seq. (West Supp.
1975); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-30-505 (1973); Delaware,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 6905 (1974) : Hawaii, HAWAII REv. STAT. § 103-25
(1968); Indiana, IND. CODE § 5-16-1-2 (1974); Maine. ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 5, § 1747 (1964); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 123.501 (1967);
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The advantages and disadvantages of pre-qualification
are numerous,23 but when applied to the circumstances existing in Wyoming its advisability and feasibility become evident. The greatest advantage in pre-qualifying contractors
is the improved assurance that public works contracts will
not be let to irresponsible bidders. Under the present procedures in Wyoming the awarding body determines general
bidder responsibility after the bids are open, this being a
system of "post-qualification." In light of the absence of
any uniform criteria for determining bidder responsibility,
reliance on "post-qualification" can result in a hit-or-miss
approach, which places a great deal of weight behind hearsay
and the contractor's own representations relative to his responsibility. Secondly, pre-qualification would serve to shorten deliberation time and expense presently incurred by Wyoming awarding bodies in their determination of bidder responsibility. Under present Wyoming procedures, in order
to be in compliance with their statutory charge to award
public works projects to the "lowest responsible bidder," 4
awarding bodies must make some determination of bidder
responsibility. Usually this takes the form of a bid specification requirement that a bidding contractor provide a statement of financial responsibility and experience credentials.
It is then up to the awarding body to evaluate such statements along with any other information it can obtain about
the contractor. A uniform system of state-wide pre-qualification, such as that used in California, 5 or Indiana," would
obviate the need for such procedures since the awarding body
would need only request such information from the appropriate state agency. Third, a system of pre-qualification
would save the bidding contractors time and money. Rather
than submitting information in support of their responsibility every time a public works project is advertised for

23.
24.
25.
26.

Montana, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-3502 (1947); Nebraska, NEB. REV.
STAT. § 73-102 (1971); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 118 (Supp.
1974); Oregon, ORE. REV. STAT. § 279.014 (1974); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 642 (1962); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.29 (1965).
COHEN, supra note 6, at 89-92.
WYo. STAT. § 15.1-13 (Supp. 1975).
CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 14310, et seq. (West Supp. 1975).
IND. CODE § 5-16-1-2 (1974).
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bids, the contractors need only file an annual statement with
the appropriate state agency.
The opponents of bidder pre-qualification suggest that
it will restrict the number of responsible bidders and thus
have adverse effects on competitive bidding.27 Although this
may be a supportable fear in a state with relatively few construction contractors, the danger can be considerably reduced
by equal treatment and carefully drawn procedures.2" Secondly, those who oppose pre-qualification statutes suggest
that new contractors may be shut out of bidding on many
projects due to their lack of experience in the public works
area." A significant problem could arise in Wyoming in
this respect, given the relative infancy of the construction
business and its great potential for growth. However, procedures such as the right to a hearing on pre-qualification
ratings have been used in other states"0 to avoid such problems.
The California Approach
Assuming that a system of contractor pre-qualification
is needed in Wyoming, it is desirable at this point to consider and evaluate approaches used in several other states.
Perhaps the most comprehensive system of contractor prequalification and rating exists in California." The California system provides that the State Department of Public
Works may require answers to a standard questionnaire and
a financial statement, including past experience in performing public works, from all prospective bidders. 2 The Department is also directed to establish a uniform system for rat27.

COHEN, supra note 6, at 89.

28. RHYNE, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS 70 (1952).
29. COHEN, supra note 6, at 90.
30. IND. CODE § 4-13-7-16 (1974). The Indiana procedure provides for certification of all contractors bidding on public works projects. IND. CODE § 4-137-1 (1974). If a contractor is denied certification he may appeal this decision under the Indiana Administrative Adjudication Act. IND. CODE § 4-221-24 (1974).

31.

CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 14310, et seq. (West Supp. 1975). For an analysis of the
California system of pre-qualification, see Comment, Due Process in Public
Contracts: Pre-Award Hearings to Determine Responsibility of Bidders,
5 PACIFIC L. J. 142, 146 (1974).

32.

CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 14310 (West 1963). This requirement is made mandatory for contracts the estimated cost of which exceeds $50,000. Wyoming
could, of course, choose the dollar limit it finds to be most desirable.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol11/iss1/8

8

Beppler: Competitive Bidding on Public Works in Wyoming: Determinations of

1976

COMMENT

251

ing bidders which utilizes the aforementioned questionnaires
and financial statements; the Department makes such rating determinations according to the size of public works
projects." It would seem best to combine the above system
with some type of hearing procedure so that dissatisfied
contractors could have a means to redress their grievances. 4
The California system would seem to fit well into already existing agencies in Wyoming. The recently established State Department of Economic Planning and Development 5 is given the authority to "[r]eceive, initiate, investigate, consider, recommend and promote . . . projects, plans
and proposals for orderly and planned development, improvement and extension of public works .... ."" The establishment
of a uniform system of contractor pre-qualification for public works projects would seem logically to fall within the
Department's purpose of "the planning for and the development of the physical and economic resources of the state.""7
Since all departments of state government are subject to the
Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, 8 the mechanisms
are already established to afford aggrieved contractors the
ability to contest the Department's determination of their
qualifications.
The Idaho and Montana Approach
Several other approaches are available to Wyoming in
order to improve its competitive bidding procedure. The
neighboring states of Idaho and Montana have adopted licensing procedures which seek to obtain the same advan33. CAL GOV'T. CODE § 14311 (West Supp. 1975), provides as follows:
The department shall adopt and apply a uniform system of
rating bidders, on the basis of the standard questionnaires and
financial statements, in respect to the size of the contracts upon
which each bidder is qualified to bid ...
In no event shall any bidder be awarded a contract if such contract award would result in the bidder having under contract work
in excess of that authorized by his prequalification rating ...
34. See, e.g., HAWAI REV. STAT. § 103-25 (1968) ; IND. CODE § 4-13-7-16 (1974)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 1749 (1964); and ORE. REV. STAT. § 279.024
(1974).
35. WYO. STAT. §§ 9-160.19 to -160.39 (Supp. 1975).
36. WYo. STAT. § 9-160.29(a) (iii) (Supp. 1975).
37. WYO. STAT. § 9-160.19 (Supp. 1975).
38. WYO. STAT. § 9-276.20 (Supp. 1975). The term "agency" is defined to include any department of the state. WYo. STAT. § 9-276.19(b) (1) (Supp.
1975).
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tages available under a pre-qualification statute. In Idaho,
it is unlawful to engage in the business of public works contractor without first obtaining a license.3 " Upon application
for a public works contractor license, the Public Works Contractors State License Board may investigate, classify, and
qualify applicants by written or oral examinations. ° According to the established qualifications, the contractor is classified into license classes based on the size of public works
contract which the contractor is qualified to execute. 1 The
Montana licensing system seems to have been a model for
the one adopted in Idaho and, therefore,42 contains no significant deviations from the Idaho scheme.
The licensing approach could be accomplished in Wyoming under the auspices of the newly created Department
of Revenue and Taxation, 3 with added statutory provisions
establishing authority to transfer requested information to
public works contract awarding bodies so that they can have
proof of contractor responsibility,44 or providing for the development of lists of qualified contractors."
PRE-AWARD HEARINGS AND DETERMINATION
OF BIDDER RESPONSIBILITY

Whether or not Wyoming chooses to implement a prequalification or licensing system to determine public contractor responsibility, questions of due process dictate consideration of the appropriateness of hearing procedures within the
39.

IDAHO CODE § 54-1902 (1957).

Failure to obtain a license by a person or

firm acting in the capacity of a public works contractor may lead to im-

position of criminal penalties. IDAHO CODE § 54-1920 (Supp. 1975).
40. IDAHO CODE § 54-1910 (Supp. 1975). This provision also sets forth the
qualification criteria to be required of the applicant, including experience
and knowledge of constructon-related laws and practices; character; financial responsibility; and the size and scope of contract work completed within the prior three years.
41. IDAHO CODE § 54-1904 (Supp. 1975). License fees are charged at a sum
dependent upon which license class the contractor is assigned. Licenses
are issued for one year and renewable at the same cost as the original
license. IDAHO CODE § 54-1912 (Supp. 1975).
42. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-3501, et seq. (Supp. 1974).
43. WYO. STAT. §§ 39-43.1 to -43.6 (Supp. 1975). This type of department is
used in Montana to carry out the purposes of its public works contractor
license provisions. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 84-3503 (Supp. 1974).
44.

45.

The licensing approach has been adopted in several other states. See N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 6-6-2 (1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-07-02 (Supp. 1973); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 56-410 (Supp. 1974); and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 39.06.010
(1972).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-30-505(1) (k) (1973).
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competitive bidding context. This is particularly true since
pre-qualification will not solve problems raised in the bid
variation situation. Wyoming presently has no statutory
provisions which would require a pre-award hearing on the
issue of bidder responsibility.46 However, such a requirement may arguably be judicially determined to exist.
The United States Supreme Court, in Board of Regents
of State Colleges v. Roth," addressed the question as to when
a person is entitled to a hearing under the Due Process clause
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution." In concluding that the "requirements of procedural
due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty
and property,"5 the Court stated, "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."'" The essential question,
when one applies the preceding concepts to the competitive
bidding context, becomes whether a bidder has a legitimate
claim of entitlement to a public works contract.
The questions concerning due process hearing requirements should only arise in situations where the lowest bidder
is not awarded a public works contract. There are at least
three ways in which this situation may arise under the
Wyoming statutory provision directing awarding bodies to
let public works contracts to the "lowest responsible bidder:" 2 1) The awarding body may make an express determination that the lowest bidder is not responsible; 2) The
awarding body may let a contract to a bidder other than the
46. The only state presently having a statute which expressly grants a hearing
to a bidder dissatisfied with a contract award is Illinois. ILL. STAT. ANN.
ch. 24, § 9-2-107 (Smith-Hurd 1962).
47. For an excellent overview of the arguments supporting the constitutional
right to a pre-award hearing, see Comment, Due Process in Public Contracts: Pre-Award Hearings to Determine Responsibility of Bidders, supra
note 31, at 156-61.
48. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
49. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
50. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, supra note 48, at 569.
51. Id. at 577.
52. WYo. STAT. § 15.1-13 (Supp. 1975).
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lowest bidder without such an express determination ;" and
3) The awarding body may invalidate the bid of the lowest
bidder because of an alleged material departure from the bid
specifications. 4 Whether the lowest bidder in any of these
three situations is entitled to a hearing on his disqualification rests on whether he can establish a legitimate property
interest in the public works contract. 5
Recent California case law indicates a tendency in the
courts to find such a property interest, even though the general rule is that the lowest bidder does not obtain a vested
or property interest in the contract merely by reason of the
fact that he submitted the lowest bid.5" The court, in Swinerton & Walberg Co. v. City of Inglewood-Los Angeles County
Civic Center Authority, 7 held that if the requirements of
the Restatement of Contracts, Section 90, are met then an
informal contract results between the "lowest responsible
bidder" and the awarding body which entitles said bidder
to damages for breach of this informal contract if he does
not receive the public works contract.5 The significance of
53. City of Inglewood-Los Angeles County Civic Center Authority v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, 7 Cal. 3d 861, 103 Cal. Rptr. 689, 500 P.2d
601, 604 (1972). The court therein found that if a public works contract
is let to one other than the lowest bidder, the implication is that the lowest
bidder is not responsible.
54. The Wyoming Supreme Court stated, in Centric Corp. v. Barbarossa &
Sons, Inc., supra note 10, at 875, that "any material departure from the
bid specifications invalidates a bid and the defaulting party cannot he
classed as a bidder." It seems that what the court means is that the discovery of a material departure from the bid specifications in the bid of
the lowest bidder is a determination that the lowest bidder is not responsible and, therefore, is no longer to be considered for the public works contract. See Albert F. Ruehl Co. v. Board of Trustees of School For Indus.
Educ., supra note 8.
55. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, supra note 48, at 577.
56. 10 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.77 (3rd ed. 1966). This general rule is truly applicable only where the awarding body is entitled to
reject all bids. Such powers are vested in Wyoming governing bodies under
Wyo. STAT. § 15.1-13 (Supp. 1975).
57. 40 Cal. App. 3d 98, ...--P.2d ...
,114
Cal. Rptr. 834 (1974).
58. Id. at 837-38. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932) provides that:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on
the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is-binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement
of the promise.
The court determined that the awarding body promised in the solicitation
of bids to award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder and, furthermore, that the bidder's reliance on such promise was justified even though
the body retained the right to reject all bids. To deny this would make the
body's promise "an illusory one" and would "render the whole competitive
bidding process nugatory."
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this holding is in its implication that every "lowest responsible bidder" has a legitimate claim of entitlement to a public
works contract. At a minimum, the decision means "that
the low monetary bidder has a right to the contract subject
to defeasance by a finding of non-responsibility." 9 Assuming that the low bidder has a legitimate claim of entitlement
to the contract award, deprivation of that right by a finding
of non-responsibility would result in a valid claim to the
right to a hearing consistent with due process requirements."
The preceding analysis is supported to a certain extent
by recent case law. The foundation case in the area of hearing rights for unsuccessful low bidders is Housing Authority
of Opelousa v. Pittman Construction Co.,6 wherein the court
held that before an awarding body can disqualify a low bidder as being non-responsible, the low bidder has the right to
be heard and the body has the duty to listen on the subject
of responsibility. 2 The court, however, refused to go so far
as to say that the awarding body must hold a full evidentiary
hearing." A number of jurisdictions have followed the general Pittman rule,64 but at least one of those jurisdictions
would require a full evidentiary hearing.
It would seem
that the decision whether to afford a full hearing rests on
the degree to which one believes a property interest in the
public works contract attaches and, therefore, the rule varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
59. Comment, Due Process in Public Contracts: Pre-Award Hearings to Determine Responsibility of Bidders, supra note 31, at 158.
60. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, supra note 48, at 569.
61. Housing Authority of Opelousa v. Pittman Constr. Co., supra note 7.
62. Id. at 703-04. The court premised this finding on the belief that a denial
to the low bidder of an opportunity to disprove irresponsibility offends
one's sense of fair play and is an arbitrary use of discretion inconsistent
with the public works law.
63. Id. at 704.
64. City of Inglewood-Los Angeles County Civic Center Authority v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, supra note 53, 500 P.2d at 607; D. Stamato
& Co., Inc. v. Township of Vernon, 131 N.J. Super. 151, 329 A.2d 65, 68
(1974).
65. Seacoast Constr. Corp. v. Lockport Urban Renewal Agency, 72 Misc. 2d
372, 339 N.Y.S.2d 188 (1972).
16. Cf., City of Inglewood-Los Angeles County Civic Center Authority v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, supra note 53. This case preceded
the determination in Swinerton & Walberg Co. v. City of Inglewood-Los
Angeles Civic Center Authority, supra note 57, and as a result it might
be contended in future California cases that the unsuccessful low bidder
is entitled to a full evidentiary hearing consistent with the requirements
of procedural due process.
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At a minimum, awarding bodies throughout Wyoming
should provide some procedural mechanism by which an unsuccessful low bidder may contest a determination that he
is not a responsible bidder." An aggrieved low bidder should
at least be given notification of any evidence showing nonresponsibility, afforded an opportunity to rebut such evidence, and permitted to submit evidence that he is qualified
to perform the contract in question." Ideally, the dual goals
of competitive bidding-benefit to the taxpaying public and
fairness to bidding contractors-can be reached if statutory
provisions are properly followed. However, recent studies
of Wyoming counties and municipalities indicate that some
governing bodies do not comply with such provisions.0 " As
a result, supplemental legislation in the form of pre-qualification or licensing provisions seems necessary to protect the
public interest. On the other hand, if the opportunity arises,
Wyoming courts should be urged to afford contractors their
procedural due process rights.7 The necessity for such improvements in the present Wyoming competitive bidding system may well become crucial if the state is to adequately
meet the burden of increased development.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES
IN THE WYOMING RESIDENT CONTRACTOR
PREFERENCE STATUTE

Another area of concern relative to the Wyoming competitive bidding process on public works projects, is the preference granted to resident contractors over nonresident con67. Such a mechanism already exists in the form of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-276.19 to -276.33 (Supp. 1975), under
which all agencies are to "[a]dopt rules of practice setting forth the nature
and requirements of all formal and informal procedures available in connection with contested cases." WYO. STAT. § 9-276.20 (a) (1) (Supp. 1975).
See Comment, Competitive Bidding-Public Construction Contracts In The
State of Washington, 39 WASH. L. REV. 796, 805-06 (1964), for an analysis
applying the Washington Administrative Procedure Act to determinations
of bidder responsibility.
68. City of Inglewood-Los Angeles County Civic Center Authority v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, supra note 53, at 607.

69.

MINCE

&

BLEVINS,

EFFECT OF LAW ON COUNTY AND

MUNICIPAL ExPENDI-

TURES 115-16 (1975).
70. The Wyoming Supreme Court indirectly supports this contention when it
finds that an awarding body, given sufficient time and information could
have concluded that a departure from bid specifications was not material
and, therefore, a low bidder should not have been disqualified. Centric
Corp. v. Barbarossa & Sons, Inc., supra note 10, at 878.
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tractors. 1 The concern rests on issues relating to the constitutionality of such a statute in light of recent court pronouncements, and the advisability of such a statute notwithstanding one constitutional question.
The constitutionality of the five percent resident contractor preference statute was raised before the Wyoming
Supreme Court in Harding v. State.12 An unsuccessful nonresident subcontractor alleged that the provisions of Sections
9-663 and 9-664, Wyoming Statutes (1957), violated Section
6 of article 1 of the Wyoming Constitution, and Section 1
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.7" The court, however, refused to rule on the constitutional issues raised on the ground that the general contractor
was not alleged to be an agent or subdivision of the state
and, therefore, since the plaintiff had not been denied a contract by the state
he had no standing to raise the constitu4
issues.1
tional
Prior to this decision, the constitutionality of the preference statute had been raised in a Wyoming Attorneys General Opinion.75 The Opinion concluded that Sections 9-663
and 9-664, Wyoming Statutes (1957), were constitutional in
that it was within the state's general police power to regulate
the conditions under which public work is done and, therefore, the Legislature was at liberty to encourage local in71. WYO.

72.

73.

74.
75.

STAT. § 9-664 (1957), granting this preference is set out, supra
note 3. The definition of "resident" as set forth in WYO. STAT. § 9-663
(Supp. 1975), can be found, supra note 9. It should be noted that there
are limits on the amount of work a successful resident bidder can subcontract to a non-resident subcontractor. WYO. STAT. § 9-665 (1957) (limited
to not more than 20 per cent).
478 P.2d 64 (Wyo. 1970). In this case a non-resident subcontractor submitted a bid to a general contractor who had been awarded a contract for
mechanical work on a school. The non-resident subcontractor's bid was
denied on the basis of Wyo. STAT. §§ 9-663 and 9-664 (1957).
Id. at 65. WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 6, provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." It is assumed, but not explained in the opinion, that the plaintiff also alleged a
violation of due process and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Harding v. State, supra-note 72, at 66.
49-0p. ATr'Y GEN. 236 (Wyo. 1963). The State Superintendent of Public
Instruction requested the opinion to answer questions raised in a situation
where the second low bidder on a school construction project claimed the
low bidder was a non-resident and, therefore, was not entitled to the contract under the preference statute. The opinion suggested that the low bidder
had not complied with the technical "resident" requirements of WYo. STAT.
§ 9-663 (1957).
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dustry by such statutory enactments. 6 In the light of a
recent decision by the Wyoming Supreme Court, the question
as to the weight to be given such an opinion is certainly open
to argument." The conclusion must be drawn at this point
that the constitutionality of the Wyoming preference statute remains undecided.
Arizona is the only jurisdiction which has clearly decided the constitutionality of its contractor preference statute."8 In Schrey v. Allison Steel Manufacturing Co.,' the
court held that Arizona's five percent preference statute
was not violative of the state's constitutional bar against
special legislation, basing its decision on the ground that
such a statute bears a reasonable relationship to a legitimate
state interest.8 " In City of Phoenix v. Wittman Contracting
Co.,"1 the court found the same statute nonviolative of the
Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution,
again resting its decision on the belief that the statute had a
rational basis.8 " Finally, the court, in City of Phoenix v.
Superior Court,s" summarily rejected allegations that the
preference statute violated the Equal Protection and Inter-4
state Commerce clauses of the United States Constitution.
76. Id. at 239-40. In so concluding, the then Attorney General, John F. Raper,
relied totally on the case of Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
77. The Attorney General derives his authority to issue such opinions from
WYO. STAT. § 9-125 (Supp. 1975). The weight to be given such an opinion
was indirectly addressed in Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574 (1974),
wherein the Wyoming Supreme Court implicitly found that an Attorney
General Opinion may provide a partial basis for a justiciable controversy.
Since the question was not directly addressed the answer remains unclear.
78. AmIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-241 (1974), provides as follows:
B. In awarding the contract for work to be paid for from
public funds, bids of contractors who have satisfactorily performed
prior public contracts, and who have paid state and county taxes
within the state for not less than two successive years immediately
prior to submitting a bid ... shall be deemed a better bid than the
bid of a competing contractor who has not paid such taxes, whenever the bid of the competing contractor is less than five per cent
lower ....
It should be noted that the Arizona preference statute rests on whether
the contractor has paid certain taxes within a specified time before the
bidding, whereas the Wyoming preference statute rests totally on a determination of residency..
79. 75 Ariz. 282, 255 P.2d 604 (1953).
80. Id. at 607. The reasonable basis found was that it is proper to prefer
contractors who have paid state and local taxes since they have contributed
to the fund from which they seek to reap a benefit.
81. 20 Ariz. App. 1, 509 P.2d 1038 (1973).
82. Id. at 1042-43. See Brazie v. Cannon & Wendt Elee. Co., 1 Ariz. App. 490,
405 P.2d 281, 284 (1965) (applies analysis to subcontractor preferences).
83. 109 Ariz. 533, 514 P.2d 454 (1973).
84. Id. at 456.
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Each of the cases in this line of Arizona precedent rests on
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Heim v.
McCall,"5 wherein the Court held that, "it belongs to the
State, as guardian and trustee for its people, and having
control of its affairs, to prescribe the conditions upon which
it will permit public work to be done on its behalf, or on behalf of its municipalities (emphasis added)."86 It is the
basis and continuing vitality of this decision which causes
the concern of this writer over the constitutionality of Wyoming's contractor preference statute.
The issues to be resolved in any discussion of preference
statute constitutionality are relatively easy to set forth, but
extremely difficult to answer. The major argument supporting the constitutionality of a contractor preference statute
is that such an enactment provides a rational means by which
the public interest in encouraging local industry can be
achieved. 7 On the other hand, opponents of such a preference statute assert that there is a public interest in awarding
public works contracts at the lowest possible price, and that
this interest is undermined if contracts are awarded on the
basis of residency rather than price. 8 The questions presented in attempting to balance these arguments are threefold: 1) Does the state have a legitimate interest in encouraging local industry in the construction field? 2) Is the
contractor preference statute a rational means of approaching this interest? 3) Does the preference statute violate
fundamental rights in liberty and property, or establish a
scheme under which rights to equal protection or due process
are violated?
85. Heim v. McCall, supra note 76.
86. Id. at 191. The Court made this statement as justification for upholding a
New York statute which prohibited the employment of alien laborers on
public works projects. The language for such a pronouncement was derived
from an earlier decision, Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903),
wherein the Court upheld a Kansas statute limiting the number of hours
per day which could be worked on public projects.
87. Schrey v. Allison Steel Mfg. Co., supra note 79, at 607.
88. Inge v. Board of Pub. Works of Mobile, 135 Ala. 187, 33 So. 678 (1903);
Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121, 8 P.2d 591, 594 (1932). These decisions deal with preferences granted to resident over alien laborers in employment on public works projects. See WYO. CONST. art. 19, § 3, prohibiting alien labor on public works projects.
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The United States Supreme Court has held that states
have a legitimate interest in controlling the "conditions"
under which public works are performed and, therefore, the
first question can be answered in the affirmative.89 The
Court, in establishing this doctrine, also ruled that a restriction on alien employment in the public works area was a
legitimate means of control.9 " This latter ruling has been
seriously questioned in recent case law. The Supreme Court
of California, in Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State,9 held that a
statute prohibiting employment of aliens on public works
was unconstitutional in that it created a classification which
arbitrarily discriminated against certain persons without
any rational relationship to a legitimate state interest." One
of the bases for the court's decision was that the holding in
Heim v. McCall" could no longer stand in the light of another
United States Supreme Court decision, Takahashi v. Fish
& Game Commission," wherein the Court "dealt a death
blow to the 'proprietary' rationale as a justification for exclusion of aliens from certain occupations." 5 The question,
of course, is whether this decision can be analogized to apply
to a competitive bidding statute which grants a preference
to resident contractors.
The true significance of the Purdy decision lies in its
rejection of the thought that the exercise of a proprietary as
opposed to a governmental function justifies preferences
relative to public works projects. A divergent viewpoint,
however, does exist in other jurisdictions. A Florida United
States District Court, in American Yearbook Co.v. Askew,"0
held that the award of public printing contracts was a proprietary function which justifies certain statutory provisions
which required that all such printing be done within the
89. Heim v. McCall, supra note 76, at 191. The Court therein spoke only to
the "conditions" relating to employment of laborers on public works projects, but the rule can be and has been extended to include all facets of
public works thereby including the award of public works contracts.
90. Id.
91. 71 Cal. 2d 566, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 456 P.2d 645 (1969).
92. Id. at 658.
93. Heim v. McCall, supra note 76.
94. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
95. Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, supra note 91, at 657. See Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d
1213 (1971).
96. 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D.Fla. 1972).
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state.9" The implication of this decision is that if a proprietary function can be established, there is sufficient justification for preferences which may discriminate against nonresident bidders and in favor of resident bidders.98 Residency, however, has been declared to be violative of the Equal
Protection clause when used as a determinative basis for
public employment.9" The reasoning of these later cases is
based on a belief that the state of residence of a public employee in no way guarantees that better work will be done,
that unemployment will be reduced or that the human resources of a state will be upgraded." 0 Realizing the existence
of these numerous divergent views, one would find it difficult to conclude that the constitutionality of contractor preference statutes has been finally determined in respect to the
concepts of fundamental rights and equal protection. The
same conclusion can be reached in respect to interstate commerce clause implications, 0 ' although the divergence is not
as significant.
Even though it is conceivable that Wyoming's contractor preference statute would be upheld, public policy considerations dictate its repeal. First, recent studies indicate
that the presence of a contractor preference is frequently
costly to taxpayers, particularly in areas close to the Wyoming borders. 0 ' This additional cost placed on public works
projects can only be justified if it is less than the differential in expenditures made by resident as opposed to nonresident contractors in the state. Although this occurrence was
probably contemplated by the drafters of the Wyoming contractor preference law, no evidence could be found to support
97. Id. at 721. The court therein cites to Heim v McCall, supra note 76, as justification for its decision.
98. Id. at 724. The court cites Schrey v. Allison Steel Mfg. Co., supra note 79,
as an example of such a justifiable preference. See Garden State Dairies
of Vineland, Inc. v. Sills, 46 N.J. 349, 217 A.2d 126, 129 (1966), which
also cites Schrey for support in concluding that there is a rationale basis
for preferring resident milk producers bidding on state contracts.
99. York v. State, 53 Hawaii 557, 498 P.2d 644, 646 (1972); State v. Wylie,
516 P.2d 142 (Alas. 1973).
100. Id. at 646 and 149, respectively.
101. See State ex tel. Collins v. Senatobia Blank Book & Stationery Co., 115
Miss. 254, 76 So. 258 (1917), and Garden State Dairies of Vineland, Inc.
v. Sills, supra note 98, both upholding state material preference statutes
as non-violative of the interstate commerce clause. Cf., People ex Tel.
Treat v. Coler, 166 N.Y. 144, 59 N.E. 776 (1901).
102. MINGE & BLEVINS, supra note 69, at 119-20.
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the supposition. Secondly, the potential alleged benefits of
the preference can only be obtained if the rules relating to
residence are substantially met, rather than only technically
met. Recent unreported cases in Wyoming district courts
would indicate that in some instances nonresident contractors create subsidiary "paper" resident contracting firms
in order to obtain the advantages of the preference. If the
above two hypotheses are true, the preference statute
needs serious reconsideration, particularly in light of the
fact that Wyoming is among a minority of jurisdictions
which have such statutes.'
CONCLUSION

The Wyoming statutes relating to competitive bidding
on public works projects will be increasingly used as the
state continues to develop. As a result, a clearer understanding of their meaning is crucial. Glaringly absent from the
statutory provisions is any definition of "lowest responsible
bidder," even though this is the abstract being who should
be awarded the contract by a governing body. This Comment
has set forth the various attributes of the "lowest responsible bidder," particularly in regard to the concept of responsibility. However, in dealing with potential problems of
application of these attributes as they arise is not the approach to be taken by a state destined for future development. As a result, it is suggested that legislative consideration be given to either pre-qualification or licensing provisions. As an additional safeguard, and in an attempt to
protect the integrity of the competitive bidding process, this
Comment suggests that procedures be established to afford
a dissatisfied bidder recourse consistent with the requirement of due process. Finally, consideration is given to the
103.

See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-241 (1974) (5%); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 14622 (1968) (3%) FLA. STAT. ANN. § 255.04 (1975) (if no increase in cost
is involved); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 103-53.5 (Supp. 1974) (per cent based
on retail rate of general excise tax) ; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:2221 (Supp.
1975) (per cent reciprocal to that granted a non-resident bidding contractor
in his home state); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1301 (1964) (if no increase in cost); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 16.365 (1967) (reciprocal) ; MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 82-1924 (Supp. 1975) (3%); NEB. REV. STAT. § 73-101.01
(1971) (reciprocal); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 6-6-1 (1966) (whenever practicable) ; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 5-19-3 (1974) (reciprocal); VA. CODE
ANN. § 11-20.1 (1973) (reciprocal); and Wyo. STAT. § 9-664 (1957) (5%).
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constitutionality of the Wyoming resident contractor preference statute. It is contended that the statute violates equal
protection concepts and, even if it does not, that the policy
rationale behind such a statute is not consistent with the
public interest. In any situation subject to change, reevaluations of substantive and procedural concepts must be made.
The competitive bidding procedure for public works projects
is in need of such a reevaluation so that it can be better
equipped to meet the demands of the future.
TIMOTHY 0. BEPPLER
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